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Tara is a victim of identity takeover, account takeover, and social insurance number fraud resulting from the 2018 BMO Data Breach, where there is a real risk of significant harm. Tara has taken several steps to address this issue without success: 1) RCMP Reliability Check, 2) Enhanced Police Information Check (E-PIC), 3) Vulnerable Sector Check, 4) NEXUS, 4) Biometrics, 6) Bail Verification, and 7) Medical/Dental Records to work/volunteer within high-risk communities, and cross borders as a trusted traveler.
Details are located under the section: Countering Identity Takeover - https://www.routledge.com/9781032960142.
Tara’s PII was re-used by criminals in Canada, US, UK and the Caribbean, and has filed over 22 police reports in jurisdiction to include the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), and the police refused to conduct an investigation on this item. After many letters to the Government of Canada, Tara was instructed to file complaints against the Police through the Office of the Independent Review Director (OIPRD). Many complaints were filed, with three inaccurate reports produced. The inaccuracies in the reports were challenged. It is important to note that the OIPRD Investigator did not interview Tara, nor did any of the Jurisdictional Police Officer in relation to Account Takeover, SIN Fraud and Identity Takeover.
What is interesting is the York Region Police closed the police report for SIN Fraud, Account Takeover, and Identity Fraud, concluding with the following “Thank you for submitting your report 2024-808305 to York Regional Police. Based on the information provided, a suspect could not be identified in this incident, and the investigation has been closed. A permanent record of this incident will be retained by York Regional Police.”
However, in the OIPRD report(s), they show clear evidence that a suspect was identified, and a photo of the suspect used in the investigation resulting in evidence to support re-use of PII by a criminal and documented by the OIPRD. PII re-use includes: (1) excessive reissue of the victim’s credit card due to fraudulent charges, (2) the reuse of the victim’s social insurance number, (3) the reuse of the victim’s financial license, (4) Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) account takeover, (5) monies missing from several accounts with clear evidence of account takeover, (6) the use of the name KISSON on the Equifax and TransUnion credit reports, and bank loans, (7) targeted attacks on the victim’s car and home, and (8) impersonation, for example University of Toronto, LA Fitness, TeraVarna, Trinity Medical School. However, no action was taken by the Police. The horrifying truth is that Tara was targeted by the Police, and this has impacted her life, specifically work, marriage, children, income, government taxes, social assistance, OSAP funding, entrepreneurial activities, church and volunteer activities.
Tara’s case was reviewed by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC), and pursuant to subsection 14(1) of PIPEDA, Tara has the option to apply to the Federal Court of Canada for a hearing in respect of the matters raised in her complaint.
Almost eight years of soliciting police attention without success and missing disclosure, as jurisdictional police refuse to investigate. Tara’s treatment by the Police is an inequity, and should be reviewed under Social Justice, as there is clear evidence of police discrimination, police bias, and over policing.
Questions asked include ... What are the Police Hiding? Where is the Disclosure? Why Federal Court?
